2017年12月六级第3套长篇阅读匹配原文翻译及答案

A) The battle between Apple and law enforcement officials over unlocking a terrorist's smartphone is the culmination of a slow turning of the tables between the technology industry and the United States government.

苹果公司与执法官员之间关于解锁恐怖分子智能手机的斗争，是科技行业与美国政府之间缓慢扭转局势的高潮。

B) After revelations by the former National Security Agency contractor Edward J. Snowden in 2013 that the government both cozied up to (讨好) certain tech companies and hacked into others to gain access to private data on an enormous scale, tech giants began to recognize the United States government as a hostile actor. But if the confrontation has crystallized in this latest battle, it may already be heading toward a predictable conclusion: In the long run, the tech companies are destined to emerge victorious.

在2013年，前国家安全局承包商爱德华·J·斯诺登揭露政府既讨好某些科技公司又入侵其他公司以大规模获取私人数据后，科技巨头开始将美国政府视为敌对行动者。但如果对峙在这场最新斗争中变得清晰，它可能已朝着一个可预见的结论发展：长远来看，科技公司注定会获胜。

C) It may not seem that way at the moment. On the one side, you have the United States government's mighty legal and security apparatus fighting for data of the most sympathetic sort: the secrets buried in a dead mass murderer's phone. The action stems from a federal court order issued on Tuesday requiring Apple to help the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I) to unlock an iPhone used by one of the two attackers who killed 14 people in San Bernardino, California, in December.

目前可能并非如此。一方面，美国政府强大的法律和安全机构在为最具同情心的数据而战：埋藏在一名已故大规模杀人犯手机中的秘密。这一行动源于周二发布的一项联邦法院命令，要求苹果公司协助联邦调查局（F.B.I.）解锁一部iPhone，该手机由去年12月在加利福尼亚州圣贝纳迪诺杀害14人的两名袭击者之一使用。

D) In the other corner is the world's most valuable company, whose chief executive, Timothy D. Cook, has said he will appeal the court's order. Apple argues that it is fighting to preserve a principle that most of us who are addicted to our smartphones can defend: Weaken a single iPhone so that its contents can be viewed by the American government and you risk weakening all iPhones for any government intruder, anywhere.

另一方是世界上最有价值的公司，其首席执行官蒂莫西·D·库克表示将上诉法院命令。苹果公司辩称，它正在为捍卫一个我们大多数智能手机成瘾者都能支持的原则而战：削弱一部iPhone使其内容可被美国政府查看，你就冒着削弱所有iPhone的风险，让任何政府入侵者、在任何地方都能入侵。

E) There will probably be months of legal tussling, and it is not at all clear which side will prevail in court, nor in the battle for public opinion and legislative favor. Yet underlying all of this is a simple dynamic: Apple, Google, Facebook and other companies hold most of the cards in this confrontation. They have our data, and their businesses depend on the global public's collective belief that they will do everything they can to protect that data.

可能会有数月的法律争斗，目前完全不清楚哪一方会在法庭上占上风，也不清楚在争取公众舆论和立法支持的斗争中谁会胜出。然而，这一切背后是一个简单的动态：苹果、谷歌、Facebook和其他公司在这场对抗中掌握着大部分筹码。他们拥有我们的数据，他们的业务依赖于全球公众的集体信念，即他们会尽一切努力保护这些数据。

F) Any crack in that front could be fatal for tech companies that must operate worldwide. If Apple is forced to open up an iPhone for an American law enforcement investigation, what is to prevent it from doing so for a request from the Chinese or the Iranians? If Apple is forced to write code that lets the F.B.I. get into the Phone 5c used by Syed Rizwan Farook, the male attacker in the San Bernardino attack, who would be responsible if some hacker got hold of that code and broke into its other devices?

对于必须在全球运营的科技公司来说，任何防线上的裂痕都可能是致命的。如果苹果公司被迫为美国执法调查打开一部iPhone，那么有什么能阻止它为中国或伊朗的请求做同样的事？如果苹果公司被迫编写代码让F.B.I.进入赛义德·里兹万·法鲁克（圣贝纳迪诺袭击中的男性袭击者）使用的iPhone 5c，那么如果某个黑客掌握了该代码并入侵了其他设备，谁该负责？

G) Apple's stance on these issues emerged post-Snowden, when the company started putting in place a series of technologies that, by default, make use of encryption to limit access to people's data. More than that, Apple - and, in different ways, other tech companies, including Google, Facebook, Twitter and Microsoft - have made their opposition to the government's claims a point of corporate pride.

苹果公司在这些问题上的立场出现在斯诺登事件之后，当时该公司开始实施一系列技术，默认使用加密来限制对人们数据的访问。不仅如此，苹果公司——以及以不同方式的其他科技公司，包括谷歌、Facebook、Twitter和微软——都将其对政府要求的反对作为企业自豪感的体现。

H) Apple's emerging global brand is privacy; it has staked its corporate reputation, not to mention the investment of considerable technical and financial resources, on limiting the sort of mass surveillance that was uncovered by Mr. Snowden. So now, for many cases involving governmental intrusions into data, once-lonely privacy advocates find themselves fighting alongside the most powerful company in the world.

苹果公司新兴的全球品牌是隐私；它已将企业声誉，更不用说相当的技术和财务资源投资，押注在限制斯诺登先生所揭露的那种大规模监控上。因此，现在对于许多涉及政府入侵数据的案件，曾经孤独的隐私倡导者发现自己正与世界上最强大的公司并肩作战。

I) "A comparison point is in the 1990s battles over encryption," said Kurt Opsahl, general counsel of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a privacy watchdog group. "Then you had a few companies involved, but not one of the largest companies in the world coming out with a lengthy and impassioned post, like we saw yesterday from Tim Cook. Its profile has really been raised."

“一个比较点是20世纪90年代关于加密的斗争，”电子前沿基金会（一个隐私监督组织）总法律顾问库尔特·奥普萨尔说。“那时只有几家公司参与，但没有一家世界上最大的公司发表长篇激昂的帖子，就像我们昨天从蒂姆·库克那里看到的。它的形象确实得到了提升。”

J) Apple and other tech companies hold another ace: the technical means to keep making their devices more and more inaccessible. Note that Apple's public opposition to the government's request is itself a hindrance to mass government intrusion. And to get at the contents of a single iPhone, the government says it needs a court order and Apple's help to write new code; in earlier versions of the iPhone, ones that were created before Apple found religion on (热衷于) privacy, the F.B.I. may have been able to break into the device by itself.

苹果和其他科技公司还有一张王牌：不断使其设备越来越难以访问的技术手段。注意，苹果公司公开反对政府请求本身就是对大规模政府入侵的阻碍。要获取一部iPhone的内容，政府说它需要法院命令和苹果公司的帮助来编写新代码；在早期版本的iPhone中，那些在苹果公司热衷于隐私之前创建的版本，F.B.I.可能能够自行入侵设备。

K) You can expect that noose (束缚) to continue to tighten. Experts said that whether or not Apple loses this specific case, measures that it could put into place in the future will almost certainly be able to further limit the government's reach.

你可以预期这种束缚会继续收紧。专家表示，无论苹果公司是否输掉这个具体案件，它未来可能实施的措施几乎肯定能够进一步限制政府的触角。

L) That's not to say that the outcome of the San Bernardino case is insignificant. As Apple and several security experts have argued, an order compelling Apple to write software that gives the F.B.I. access to the iPhone in question would establish an unsettling precedent. The order essentially asks Apple to hack its own devices, and once it is in place, the precedent could be used to justify law enforcement efforts to get around encryption technologies in other investigations far removed from national security threats.

这并不是说圣贝纳迪诺案件的结果不重要。正如苹果公司和几位安全专家所辩称的，一项强制苹果公司编写软件让F.B.I.访问相关iPhone的命令将建立一个令人不安的先例。该命令本质上要求苹果公司入侵自己的设备，一旦实施，这个先例可能被用来为执法部门在远离国家安全威胁的其他调查中绕过加密技术的努力辩护。

M) Once armed with a method for gaining access to iPhones, the government could ask to use it proactively (先发制人地), before a suspected terrorist attack - leaving Apple in a bind as to whether to comply or risk an attack and suffer a public-relations nightmare. "This is a brand-new salvo in the war against encryption," Mr. Opsahl said. "We've had plenty of debates in Congress and the media over whether the government should have a backdoor, and this is an end run around that - here they come with an order to create that backdoor."

一旦掌握了访问iPhone的方法，政府可能会要求在涉嫌恐怖袭击之前先发制人地使用它——让苹果公司陷入两难境地：是遵守还是冒险面临袭击并遭受公关噩梦。“这是反加密战争中一个全新的攻击，”奥普萨尔先生说。“我们在国会和媒体上就政府是否应该拥有后门进行了大量辩论，而这是绕过那个辩论的做法——他们带着创建后门的命令来了。”

N) Yet it's worth noting that even if Apple ultimately loses this case, it has plenty of technical means to close a backdoor over time. "If they're anywhere near worth their salt as engineers, I bet they're rethinking their threat model as we speak," said Jonathan Zdziarski, a digital forensic expert who studies the iPhone and its vulnerabilities.

然而值得注意的是，即使苹果公司最终输掉这个案件，它也有足够的技术手段随着时间推移关闭后门。“如果他们作为工程师还算称职，我打赌他们正在重新思考他们的威胁模型，就像我们现在说的那样，”研究iPhone及其漏洞的数字取证专家乔纳森·兹齐亚尔斯基说。

O) One relatively simple fix, Mr. Zdziarski said, would be for Apple to modify future versions of the iPhone to require a user to enter a passcode before the phone will accept the sort of modified operating system that the F.B.I. wants Apple to create. That way, Apple could not unilaterally introduce a code that weakens the iPhone — a user would have to consent to it.

兹齐亚尔斯基先生说，一个相对简单的修复方法是，苹果公司修改未来版本的iPhone，要求用户在手机接受F.B.I.希望苹果创建的那种修改后的操作系统之前输入密码。这样，苹果公司就不能单方面引入削弱iPhone的代码——用户必须同意。

P) "Nothing is 100 percent hacker-proof," Mr. Zdziarski said, but he pointed out that the judge's order in this case required Apple to provide "reasonable security assistance" to unlock Mr. Farook's phone. If Apple alters the security model of future iPhones so that even its own engineers' "reasonable assistance" will not be able to crack a given device when compelled by the government, a precedent set in this case might lose its lasting force. In other words, even if the F.B.I. wins this case, in the long run, it loses.

“没有什么是100%防黑客的，”兹齐亚尔斯基先生说，但他指出，本案法官的命令要求苹果公司提供“合理的安全协助”来解锁法鲁克先生的手机。如果苹果公司改变未来iPhone的安全模型，使得即使自己的工程师在政府强制下也无法破解特定设备，那么本案确立的先例可能失去其持久力。换句话说，即使F.B.I.赢得这个案件，长远来看，它输了。